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‘A place for everything, and everything in its place’ 
 
John Radford 
 
 
That was the admirable advice of Mrs. Beeton in 1861.   In this issue of the Review we 
have sixteen papers on the general theme of the ‘place’ of Psychology, particularly in 
education and more particularly in higher education.   The editor and I are most grateful 
for these very interesting and valuable contributions.  For new readers, may I explain that 
they arose from my paper ‘Psychology in its place’ (PTR 14 (1)).   That was originally 
written with no thought of responses but as a one-off discussion of various issues.   There 
was an unusually long delay between acceptance and publication, due to a change of 
editor.   Some of my figures became out of date, but I don’t think that affected any of the 
issues.   When it was in press, the new editor, Paul Sander, and I came up with the idea 
that some people might care, not necessarily to reply to me, but rather to express views 
on the issues I raised, or any related ones.  Invitations were sent to a wide range of 
individuals and organizations such as the subsystems of the Society.   Thirteen is 
obviously a tiny sample of the membership of the Society, well over 40,000 strong, let 
alone the very much larger number of psychology graduates and others with a serious 
interest.   Nevertheless, several themes do emerge from the disparate contributions. 
 
Before mentioning these, I will pick up two papers which directly comment on my 
original one, though I feel with some misunderstanding of what I was trying to say.   John 
Newland raises two issues which he says are lacking in my paper.   As he says, the two 
are closely related though not identical.   One is the place of Psychology in the political 
context.   He is quite right, I did neglect this, and it is most important.   Indeed, I suggest 
it goes further even than he proposes.   There is first, as he says, the unavoidable fact that 
Psychology has to compete within the educational system for resources and prestige, and 
I agree entirely that the status of being a science is an important factor here.   I myself 
fought several battles over this, in general successfully.   But there is also the fact that 
psychologists are engaged in political issues in the wider sense (as I do touch on in my 
paper).   Psychological research and results are vitally relevant to many political issues, 
ranging from general education and child rearing, to penal policies, to the effects of mass 
media, and so on.  The Society is very active in trying to bring psychological expertise to 
bear on such matters.  There are also issues about the involvement of psychologists in 
activities such as the treatment of political prisoners, or the presentation of governmental 
propaganda.   All these are complex and difficult matters. 
 
John Newland disagrees with me when I say that a discipline does not have boundaries.   
Congruent with the foregoing, he argues that boundaries are essential in the political 
arena.   He says that I make a distinction between a profession, which has boundaries, 
and a discipline which does not.   But I also distinguish both of these from a subject, that 
is, the organization of material and resources (including the human ones), generally for 
the purposes of dissemination, especially teaching.   The boundaries he describes are 
appropriate to Psychology as a subject.   They are unavoidable, not only for political 
purposes but for everyday use.   Any examinable course, for example, must have a 
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syllabus, which must be available to the students.   Otherwise no valid and fair 
examination can be set.   Researchers and teachers must have control over their 
laboratories and other resources, or at least defined rights of access.   And so on.   I have 
banged on about these distinctions for some years now, but I still think they are both 
important and often neglected.   I have argued, for example, that they lie behind the 
disputes over the role and value of the Graduate Basis of Registration.   A discipline, I 
want to stress, in my view does not and cannot have boundaries.   It is intrinsic to the 
nature of a discipline, regarded as an enquiry into a set of apparently related problems, 
that nothing can be ruled out in principle.   The notorious ‘madness’ of George III is now 
thought to have resulted from the disease porphyria.   Whether or not this is correct, it 
would be absurd for a historian to refuse to consider it on the grounds that it is a matter of 
medicine, not history.   It is equally absurd to hold that some enquiries are ‘Psychology’ 
and others not, on a territorial basis.   All that matters is whether they help to illuminate a 
problem.    
 
This brings me to Tom Dickins’ paper.   He says that I espouse ‘a strange relativism 
about the subject, arguing that we ought to take seriously the “psychologies” of other 
cultures and embrace allied disciplines’.   I don’t think this is relativism.   Relativism to 
me means regarding all views (or cultures, etc) as of equal (or no) value.   I don’t think 
that the views about human behaviour of, say, traditional Christian or Hindu thinkers are 
of equal value to ours, because while they are the result of much experience, thought and 
insight, they lack the empirical foundation which is now being established.   ‘Original 
sin’, and reincarnation, for example, are (on my reading of the evidence) just not true.   
But this does not mean that the views are of no value, or irrelevant.   They are part of 
what humans have thought and do think about themselves, and are part of the data of 
Psychology.  If our aim is to understand behaviour, this must include behaviour in 
different times and cultures (just as Tom himself argues that we must include other 
species).  As to embracing allied disciplines, I don’t regard disciplines as entities to be 
‘embraced’ or rejected.   Every scientist, indeed every serious pursuer of an enquiry, must 
seek whatever is of use.   The label is irrelevant.   ‘Je prends mon bien oú je le trouve’, as 
Molière wrote.   Tom also says that he does not share my ‘anthropocentric vision of 
psychology – for me it is all about behaving creatures’.    If ‘anthropocenric’ implies that 
I think Psychology should only be about human beings, I reject that.   But while 
disciplines may not have boundaries, they do have something that justifies the use of 
different labels.   In my view that is a focus, by which I mean the main aim of the 
enquirers.   A focus may be broad or narrow.   ‘Behaving creatures’ is obviously wider 
than ‘human beings’.   It is factually correct, however, that the vast bulk of work we 
recognize as ‘Psychology’ is concerned with humans, as are the majority of 
‘psychologists’ even if they carry different titles .   This in no way means rejecting the 
fact that we are part of the animal kingdom.    I would also maintain that human 
behaviour is in many ways unique.  
 
Tom’s argument is in the context of advancing a case for an evolutionary ‘theory of 
human nature that avoids essentialist claims by embedding accounts of humans within a 
broader theory of nature’.   This is partly in response to what he sees as my failure to 
provide criteria for selection and combination of data (given my unselective ‘relativism’); 
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criteria which would be ‘based on a particular theoretical perspective of how the world 
works’.   I am not sure that I have such a perspective.   I do have a perspective of how we 
should go about trying to understand how the world works.   It is that of science.   By that 
I mean observing, measuring, investigating, experimenting, testing and falsifying, as far 
as we can, and all as objectively as we can manage, recognizing that we (psychologists) 
are ourselves part of the subject matter, and that our own individuality affects what we 
do.   I think Tom might agree with that.   And I would entirely agree with him that the 
behaviour of ourselves and other species cannot be understood without its evolutionary 
development.   I also agree with a later point, that therefore evolutionary psychology 
should not be considered as a subsection of the content of Psychology.   I don’t think, 
however, that evolution does or can provide an explanation for the whole of human 
behaviour including mental processes.   I’m not going to go into what ‘explanation’ may 
mean.   Evolution gives an account of how we come to have finger nails.   But it doesn’t 
tell me why some of us, and not others, paint them.   Evolutionary theory shows us the 
roots of aggression and religiosity, but I don’t think it accounts for suicide bombers.   I 
want a Psychology that does. 
 
Psychology in the political context, and the nature of Psychology as a discipline, are two 
issues raised in the papers.   There are several more, variously discussed by different 
authors.  And of course individual authors also raise unique points.   I will not try to 
summarize what they have all said, nor repeat in detail my own views.   The most general 
matter, perhaps, concerns the nature of higher education, and what should be its aims.   
There is the question of whose interests, if any, should have priority, the main 
stakeholders being students (and parents), academics, employers and government.   These 
interests are certainly not identical.   Similarly, should the individual or society, however 
conceived, come first, or can the two be reconciled.   A related question is whether higher 
education should be purely practical or vocational, or have some more general 
‘educational’ aims.   And is there something that ought to make higher education 
‘higher’, rather than merely tertiary?   Some papers suggest these might be in terms of 
social value, or of personal development. 
 
Most seem to agree that first degrees should have at least some vocational relevance.   
Another group of questions thus concerns the actual employability of Psychology 
graduates, and the extent to which degree courses fit them for employment, or ought to 
do so.   This is particularly apposite given the fact that the large majority of graduates 
will not become professional psychologists, or even perhaps enter a related occupation.   
Several suggestions are made about increasing and emphasizing the range of general 
skills that graduates might have to offer.   There is also the matter of selling a Psychology 
degree in the employment market place.   Two aspects are the views of employers, and 
the presentation skills of graduates.   It is suggested that in the first the BPS might play a 
more active role.   In 1970, when the first A-level was introduced, there were officially 
838 graduates in Psychology.   The numbers taking pre-degree courses are now, as Phil 
Banyard points out, over 180,000 a year, and degree-level courses must raise it to 
200,000 or more.   Yet the inaccuracy of the public image of Psychology remains a 
matter of concern, as it has been as long as I can remember, and still is even in the U.S.A.    
(When I was a student, it was already alleged that if someone said they were a 
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psychologist, they would get the reply, ‘What’s that?   In America the answer would be 
‘So am I’.)   
 
This raises another issue, namely the content of Psychology degrees.   Again there are 
several aspects, for example whether they should be more oriented towards practical 
application, and the extent to which they should include other disciplines.   An increasing 
number of institutions do offer combinations of Psychology with other disciplines.   This 
relates to the question of the GBR, which largely determines the Psychology part.   
Several authors give more or less an ‘all right – but’ verdict, the ‘but’ being in the 
direction of a wider and/or more flexible approach.   I in fact suggested a range of 
possibilities, from the most radical course of doing away with GBR altogether 
(admittedly hardly a practical proposition even if desirable) to a modest requirement to 
include say one related module. 
 
Then there is the matter of the relationship of degrees to other courses in Psychology, 
above all A-level.   There is of course some doubt over the whole future of A-levels, but 
whatever might replace them, much the same issues would remain.   They were in fact 
raised from the very start, though with the initially very small numbers (120 in 1970) 
there was not an immediate problem.   The problem might be seen in Piagetian terms as a 
sort of vertical dėcalage, that is the pattern repeats itself at a later stage.   The questions 
are whether A-levels are suitable for progression to a degree in Psychology (or indeed in 
something else), and whether they are a useful terminal qualification for those who do not 
go on to higher education at all.   There is the long-running problem of some Psychology 
undergraduates having the A-level while others do not, and the question as to whether it 
should be a requirement (probably neither popular nor practical), or whether degree 
courses should make special arrangements to accommodate two groups of students.   And 
there is the suggestion that degree students with A-level might be better off without it, 
since what they have learned has to be unlearned or corrected.   This too was said at the 
start.   The answer surely is, not to institute an age limit, but to improve teaching at all 
levels.   I do think, however, that there is a case for a better foundation for all degree 
work, with more emphasis on general skills and wider knowledge. 
 
And this raises one more issue, which might be called ‘Psychology for all’.   A case can 
be made for including Psychology in all education at every level.   Indeed, to use the 
useful distinction made by Graham Richards between ‘Psychology’ the discipline, and 
‘psychology’ the subject matter of that discipline, all education must necessarily include 
the latter.   Learning, for example, must be intrinsic to education of any kind, and that is 
certainly psychology.   But it is also Psychology.   It is not only teachers who can benefit 
from knowing how learning best occurs (though what teachers have been told has, in the 
past, often left much to be desired).   Anyone learning (and it is hard to think of anyone 
who does not have to do so) can, in principle, do better with an understanding of practice, 
feedback, motivation and so on.   Such things can be grasped, I venture to suggest, even 
in primary education, at least at the upper levels.    A view which goes even further is the 
general applicability of Psychology to everyday life – ‘giving Psychology away’, as 
George Miller put it years ago.   This would include such aspects as community 
psychology, personal and professional development, and coaching psychology (not 
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equated with sports coaching of course), discussed in this issue.   It can indeed be argued 
that Psychology is, in principle and often in practice, relevant to virtually every aspect of 
life, from day-to-day interaction with others to major world problems of war, famine, 
disease and so on. 
 
The general view of contributors here is optimistic, and I agree.   But all these issues, and 
more, must continue to be debated, even if at times we seem to be in some sort of 
Looking-Glass World:   
 
‘Now here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.   
If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!’    
 
I hope this issue of the Review may stimulate others to do so.    
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